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IMPOSSIBLE INVENTIONS: 
A REVIEW OF JACQUES DERRIDA'S 
THE OTHER HEADING: REFLECTIONS ON 
TODAY'S EUROPE
James P. McDaniel
What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what 
Spirit is — the absolute substance which is the unity of different 
independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition en ­
joy perfect freedom and independence: “I” that is “W e” and 
“We” that is “I .”
— Hegel, Phenomenology o f  Spirit
Somebody must be responsible for my  pain.
— S.A. Jackson, "Scribblings on Nietzsche"
Hegel’s vision of culture in the Phenomenology of Spirit culmi­
nated in the Aufhebung of identity and difference, a differentiated 
totality, as the “completion” of the dialectic of Geist. In one of his 
most recently translated works, The Other Heading: Reflections on 
Today's Europe, Jacques Derrida seems to be working (once again) 
within and against this dialectical unity of arche and eschaton, origin 
and end, identity and difference. Indeed, this work might be read as 
one of Derrida’s more obvious efforts to extend the thematic of 
differance to what we might hesitantly call “the public sphere”—as a 
rhetoric that inserts difference within identity without canceling out 
the obligation to affirm cultural identity.
This gesture of affirmation, however, entails exceeding the 
strictures of what Derrida terms “two contradictory imperatives” : on 
the one hand, or the one heading, Europe “cannot and must not accept 
the capital of a centralizing authority” that “would control and stan­
dardize, subjecting artistic discourses and practices to a grid of 
intelligibility” ; on the other hand, or the other heading, it must resist
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and renounce the proliferation of “a multiplicity of self-enclosed 
idioms or petty little nationalisms”—must resist and renounce, in 
short, difference for its own sake (39). Experiencing the aporetic 
desire both for unification and for maintaining the difference that 
makes cultural identity possible, Europe must undergo what Derrida 
terms “the experience and experiment of the impossible” (45)—the 
drive conditioned by two contradictory laws. Historically, the respon­
sibility of Europe consisted in living up to its status as “the capital,” 
the exemplary and immanent manifestation of the universal. Today, 
this responsibility needs to be thought in the rift of an aporia: respon­
sibility now  consists in rendering a contract, making a promise, whose 
principle is not to translate the idiom of the other into a totalized 
discourse of the Same, yet, at the same time, to resist the multiplica­
tion of difference for its own sake. Such is the responsibility of 
Europe today.
Hence, Derrida would urge strongly against the inane and indeed 
irresponsible “commitment to telos” that is being popularized by 
certain scholars of communication who claim to be interested in 
thinking the problematics of difference within culture. Such a com­
mitment, Derrida shows, “is exercised in the order of the possible, it 
simply follows a direction and elaborates a program. . . .  It makes of 
ethics and politics a technology” (45). In the uncritical and unreflec- 
tive “commitment to telos ,” the ethico-political becomes regulated by 
the law of the self-same, and responsibility a simple and unreflective 
exercise. Under this law, culture becomes a self-reproducing machine 
and responsibility becomes robotics. If we are to exercise responsi­
bility and commitment at all, it must then be on the order of the 
impossible, of the identity and difference of same and other as they 
articulate culture and are articulated by it.
This responsibility thought through the experience and the ex­
periment of the impossible is perhaps what is missing from Martin 
Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism,” a text of great importance to 
Derrida’s 1968 lecture “The Ends of Man” and perhaps here again in 
The Other Heading. For though Heidegger commits himself to under­
standing action in its essence, he understands the “destiny of man” in 
terms of a “horizon” that affirms the unity of arche and eschaton in the 
teleological drive towards Being. This, Derrida shows in his 1968 
lecture, is an “end of man” that produces the self-same and hence the 
obliteration of difference. It is, in the terms of The Other Heading, the 
telos  of “the capital,” of appropriation, and of “the proper.” It is the 
horror implicit also in the Hegelian notion of Absolute Knowledge 
which, as Kojeve’s lectures on the Phenomenology illustrate, is the 
death of desire.
Experiencing and experimenting with the impossible, Derrida 
faces the aporetic moment of the today, of the “now” which Heidegger’s
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Basic Problems of Phenomenology (233-234) identifies as being 
radically non-self-coincident, and turns toward rhetorical invention 
as a means of halting the dialectical drive toward either the heading or 
the other heading in an effort to exemplify their complicity. The 
impossible invention that inscribes an axiomatics of differance seems 
the only genuinely responsible invention for Derrida. He writes:
Responsibility seems to consist today in renouncing neither of 
these two contradictory imperatives. One must therefore try to 
invent gestures, discourses, politico-institutional practices that 
inscribe the alliance of these two promises or contracts: the 
capital and the a-capital, the other of the capital. That is not easy.
(44)
And later:
Any invention of the new that would not go through the endur­
ance of the antimony would be a dangerous mystification, im mo­
rality plus  good conscience, and sometimes good conscience as 
immorality. (72)
The aporia, the antimony, out of which the possibility of genuine 
responsibility emerges calls for inventiveness on the order of the 
impossible.
In order to be “new,” invention must face the impossibility 
which the deconstructor confronts at every moment. Like the rhetoric 
of Derrida’s Rousseau, who appears most forcefully in the final pages 
of On Grammatology, the invention of the impossible emerges as a 
dream in the structure of a gift from a subject who—though perhaps 
hoping, desiring, and longing for things to be otherwise—must ulti­
mately return to the language available to him even while seeking to 
change it or to turn it through the “act” of writing or speaking. Such 
is the burden and promise of the impossible invention and of 
deconstruction: to necessarily use the available means of persuasion 
while simultaneously desiring to invent them otherwise. But, if we 
take Derrida’s axiom that we must take on the responsibilty of the 
impossible, the antinomy must be endured, the aporia worked through.
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